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The Personification of the
Partnership
Harwell Wells *
What does it mean to say a business association is a legal person? The
question has shadowed the law of business organizations for at least two
centuries. When we say a business is a legal person we may be claiming that the
law distinguishes its assets, liabilities, and obligations from those of its owners;
or that it has a “real will” and personality apart from its owners; or that it in
some way can carry or assert rights generally ascribed to natural persons. This
Article sheds new light on these old questions by looking at an oft-overlooked
business form, the partnership, and at once-fierce debates over just what the
partnership is. In the decades around the turn of the twentieth century scholars
and practitioners hotly debated whether the partnership was an “aggregate” or
“entity” and whether the law should treat it as a separate legal person, debates
which culminated in the drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914).
Central to these disputes was a now-forgotten facet of legal personhood: the
moral consequences of treating a business association as a distinct legal person.
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INTRODUCTION
In no department of the law has controversy been keener than between
the advocates of the so-called “entity theory” of partnership and
advocates of the so-called ‘common law’ theory.
—Sydney R. Wrightington 1

What does it mean to say a business association is a legal
person? 2 The question, phrased in different ways, has threaded through
the law of business organizations for at least two centuries. 3 When we
say a business association is a legal person we may simply be asserting
that the law recognizes, for certain purposes, the entity as existing
separate from its owners with the ability, for instance, to have property
titled in its name, to enter into contracts, or to continue to exist when
the natural persons who are its members change. 4 It may, however,
entail grander assertions, as when in the late nineteenth century
debate swirled over whether a corporation was a creation of the state,
or had a “real will” and personality apart from its owners, or was
instead no more than an aggregate of them. 5 In the United States, the
debate has often been colored by the question of whether corporations,
specifically business corporations, can claim some of the rights granted
1.
SYDNEY R. WRIGHTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND SIMILAR
RELATIONS 144 n.1 (1916).
2.
There is a vast literature on the topic. Good introductions focusing on corporate
personhood include Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 785 (2013); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); Paul B. Miller, Corporate Personality, Purpose, and
Liability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 222 (Elizabeth
Pollman & Robert Thompson eds., 2021); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 201; ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013); Sergio Alberto
Gramitti Ricci, Archeology, Language, and Nature of Business Corporations, 89 MISS. L.J. 43
(2019); and Susan Mary Watson, The Corporate Legal Person, 19 J. CORP. L. STUD. 137 (2019).
3.
See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate
Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 245 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
4.
See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”).
5.
See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 1, 2–3 (David Runciman &
Magnus Ryan eds., 2003) (extracted from Maitland’s Introduction to Political Theories of the
Middle Ages by Otto von Gierke); VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 1–2 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1882) (discussing the
history of corporate personification); see also Mark, supra note 2; Millon, supra note 2. I recognize
that calling shareholders “owners” of a corporation can be disputed, but it is the best available
shorthand for the relationship of shareholder and corporation. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 254–55 (1999) (“[T]he
modern tendency to think of shareholders as corporate ‘owners’ and directors as their ‘agents’
glosses over several key legal doctrines . . . .”).
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to natural persons under the U.S. Constitution. 6 More recently, law and
economics scholars have focused on legal personhood by examining
whether and how the law separates out the assets and liabilities of a
business from those of its owners, and the degree to which the assets of
each are shielded from the others’ creditors. 7
This Article provides a new take on the debates over legal
personhood, its meaning and consequences, by looking at an oftoverlooked business form, the partnership, and at once-fierce debates
over whether the partnership should be viewed as a legal person
separate from its partners. In the decades around the turn of the
twentieth century, scholars and practitioners in the United States hotly
debated whether the partnership was an “aggregate” or “entity”—
whether it had any existence in the eyes of the law apart from the
individual partners who comprised it. The common law had generally
regarded the partnership as an aggregate, having no legal existence
apart from its owners. In the late nineteenth century, however,
reformers championed the entity view, which would treat the
partnership as a separate legal person, in order to bring coherence to a
sometime confusing area of the law and to bring the law into line with
merchants’ views of what a partnership was. These disputes culminated
in the drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) (“UPA”), which
after several twists and turns rejected the reformers’ proposals and
codified the view that the partnership was not a separate legal person. 8
Central to this result was a now-forgotten facet of the legal personhood
6.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). On these debates, see, for example,
Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–108 (1992); and ADAM WINKLER, WE THE
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
7.
See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 387 (2003); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000);
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1335, 1356 (2006); REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5–11 (3d ed. 2017).
8.
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1914). The aggregate/entity
divide still lives in partnership law. See, for example, REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 307 & cmt.
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997) (amended 2013); and infra text accompanying
notes 221–235. Earlier debates have, however, been largely forgotten, with a few exceptions. See
1 CHRISTINE HURT, D. GORDON SMITH, ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND
RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.03 (3d ed. Supp. 2021); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships,
Corporations, and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics,
Law, and Culture, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 29,
46–47 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 40–43 (2009); Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and
Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 401–04 (1989); Peter Winship, Drafting
Partnership Laws on the “Aggregate” or “Entity” Theory, 68 SMU L. REV. 629, 631–37 (2015).
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debates: the moral consequences that were believed to flow from
treating a business association as a distinct legal person.
This Article is a contribution to legal history, business history,
and contemporary debates over the nature of corporate personhood.
While it sets the partnership debates in larger economic and
intellectual context, it takes doctrine seriously, seeing the debates over
which legal rules to adopt for partnerships as motivated less by external
forces than by concern over the effects of internal, doctrinal
innovations. 9 It ultimately aims both to recount a significant legal
debate waged over a century ago and to highlight for contemporary
debates an overlooked aspect of legal personhood.
It begins by sketching out the roots of Anglo-American
partnership law and surveying that law’s structure as it solidified in
the nineteenth century. It then traces what became the defining issue
of nineteenth-century American partnership law—whether the
partnership was an “aggregate” or “entity”—from its origins in early
nineteenth-century attempts to reform English partnership law
through debates around the drafting of the UPA in the first decade of
the twentieth century. Along the way the Article touches on the divide
between partnership and corporation that is a basic feature of AngloAmerican business law; how legal influences flowed back and forth
across the Atlantic; recent theoretical writings on the business entities’
essential features; our understandings of late nineteenth-century
American legal thought and education; and the idea that some forms of
business are more moral than others. It closes by showing how, even
today, we have not quite resolved the aggregate/entity question.
I. THE PARTNERSHIP IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW
As a business form, the partnership, understood broadly as two
or more persons associating together to conduct business, is very old.
Its legal roots have been traced back at least to the societas of ancient
Rome, 10 and business associations with many of the elements of modern
partnerships can be found flourishing in parts of Europe during the
9.
In this, the Article joins a few other recent works taking seriously the history of business
law doctrine. See, e.g., DAVID KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY DUTY 1–3 (2018) (providing a “pre-history of legal concepts and doctrinal structures”);
Andrew S. Gold, Internal and External Perspectives: On the New Private Law Methodology, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 3, 3–8 (Andrew S. Gold, John C. P. Goldberg, Daniel
B. Kelly, Emily Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020).
10. See Andreas Martin Fleckner, Roman Business Associations, in 1 ROMAN LAW AND
ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 233, 236–39 (Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Dennis
P. Kehoe eds., 2020) (discussing Roman business forms); Hansmann et al., supra note 7, at 1356–
57 (discussing the “undeveloped status of the Roman partnership”).
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Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 11 In England, whose partnership law
was eventually transplanted to the United States, one early authority
found wide use of the partnership form during the reign of Elizabeth
I, 12 and the first treatise on partnership law, organizing and presenting
an apparently already well-established body of case law, appeared in
the 1790s. 13
Partnership law found its great expositors and standardizers in
the nineteenth century. While a host of treatises and guides discussing
partnership law appeared, three earned special prominence: Chancellor
James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law (1828), 14 Justice Joseph
Story’s Law of Partnership (1841), 15 and Lord Nathaniel Lindley’s
Treatise on the Law of Partnership (1860). 16 These works, regularly
updated, became guides on both sides of the Atlantic, testifying to the
degree to which England and the United States shared a common law
of partnership. When dealing with partnership questions, for example,
American courts frequently cited English cases, while Story’s American
treatise was influential in England. 17 As late as 1893 one American
work treated a recent decision by the House of Lords as conclusive on
the question of the definition of partnership. 18 These authorities also
occasionally drew on sources outside the common law for guidance on
partnership issues. When listing definitions of a partnership, for
instance, Lindley quoted the Prussian Code, Pufendorf, and the
11. See Charles R. Hickson & John D. Turner, Partnership, in 2 HISTORY OF WORLD TRADE
SINCE 1450, at 557 (John J. McCusker ed., 2006); RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW:
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 19–21 (2000) (discussing the
origins of partnerships); Yadira González de Lara, Business Organization and Organizational
Innovation in Late Medieval Italy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND
COMPANY LAW 65 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
12. WILLIAM WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, at x–xi (London, A. Strahan
& W. Woodfall 1794).
13. See id. On English partnership law during this era, see ANDREAS TELEVANTOS,
CAPITALISM BEFORE CORPORATIONS: THE MORALITY OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATONS AND THE ROOTS OF
COMMERCIAL EQUITY AND LAW (2021).
14. 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1–43 (Claitor’s 1985) (1828).
15. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (Bos., Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1841).
16. 1 NATHANIEL LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (London, William
Maxwell 1860). For a general account of the role of the treatise in the nineteenth century, see
A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 passim (1981).
17. For instance, discussing English law, Joshua Getzler and Mike Macnair write of “Joseph
Story’s seminal treatises.” Joshua Getzler & Mike Macnair, The Firm as an Entity Before the
Companies Acts 10–11 (Univ. of Oxford Fac. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper
No.
47/2006,
2006)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941231
[https://perma.cc/T9CC-7ZT6].
18. THEOPHILUS PARSONS & JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP 41 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co., 4th ed. 1893) (discussing Cox v. Hickman (1860) 11
Eng. Rep. 431, 8 H.L.C. 268).
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“civilian” authority Pothier, 19 while Story’s treatise asserted that “the
principles applicable to the Law of Partnership are stated with
uncommon clearness and force in the leading title of the Institutes [ ]
and those of the Digest and the code of Justinian.” 20 Yet AngloAmerican partnership law never reached total uniformity. In the
United States partnership law could vary from one state to another and
thus from English law as well. 21 Important cases shaping the law in one
jurisdiction did not arise in others, and debates over the joint stock
company, which involved partnership law, were immensely important
in England but not in the United States. 22
On the foundational question of partnership law, Kent, Story,
and Lindley agreed: a partnership was by its nature an association of
individuals, not a separate legal person. 23 As Lindley put it, “[t]he firm
is not [recognized] by lawyers as in any way distinct from the members
composing it.” 24 To simplify a bit, this meant that when A and B joined
together to operate a business as the partnership of A&B, the law saw
A and B rather than a separate entity A&B. This distinguished the
partnership from the corporation, which gained a separate legal
existence following a grant from the state, as a consequence of which
corporations could for instance hold property, enter into contracts, and
sue and be sued in the corporate name. 25 In England, one authority
explained that the difference between “joint stock companies or
partnerships, and corporations . . . is, that in the first, the law looks to
the individuals; while in the second, it sees only . . . the body corporate,
and knows not the individuals.” 26 In the United States, both Story and
Kent depicted the partnership as essentially a contract between the
partners, with additional special features deriving from agency and

19. 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 7.
20. STORY, supra note 15, at vii.
21. For instance, English and U.S. law eventually diverged on whether a term partnership
could be terminated at any time by a single partner. See infra note 66.
22. Because this article focuses on U.S. law, it sidesteps issues raised by joint-stock
companies, which were not unknown in the United States but not at the center of controversy as
they were in England. On U.S. joint-stock companies, see, for example, Blair & Pollman, supra
note 3, at 258.
23. These authors, and later authorities quoted here, were careful to point out that the rule
was different in two jurisdictions, Louisiana and Scotland, both of whose laws treated the
partnership as a separate legal person.
24. 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 164.
25. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 22–23 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832).
26. Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and
the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 45
(1996) (quoting JOHN GEORGE, A VIEW OF THE EXISTING LAW AFFECTING UNINCORPORATED JOINT
STOCK COMPANIES 29 (London, S. Sweet 1825)).
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property law. 27 For Story, the partnership was a contract between two
or more persons with “a communion of the profits thereof between
them.” 28 Each partner was agent for the other partners for purpose of
their common business, rather than acting for the partnership as a
separate entity, and the main difference between partnership and mere
agency was that partners had “a community of interest” in the property
and business. 29 Kent held much the same. 30 Neither saw the
partnership as having a legal existence apart from its members—for
instance, when discussing a corporation Kent spoke of it as “one moral
person,” but he eschewed such terms in discussing partnerships. 31
The partnership’s lack of separate legal existence had practical
consequences. Unlike a corporation, for instance, a partnership could
not hold property or contract in the firm name. Before a court of law,
the litigants in a matter involving a partnership were the individual
partners, not the partnership, so a suit by or against a partnership had
to name every partner as plaintiff or defendant, a problem where
partners were unknown or silent. 32 This also prevented a partner from
suing his partnership over partnership affairs in courts of law, for in
the eyes of the law the partner would be attempting the impossible task
of suing himself, and for the same reason partnerships with a common
member could not sue one another. 33 The reasoning here was that, if
the claim was in contract, it would in effect assert that A contracted
with A, and if in tort that A had harmed A, neither of which made
sense. 34 The law’s inflexibility in these matters explains why
partnership law was largely shaped in the then-separate equity courts,

27. A formal contract was not, however, required, so long as the essence of the agreement
between the parties was to share profit. See TELEVANTOS, supra note 13, at 17 (“If two people
entered into a profit sharing agreement they would be partners, regardless of whether or not both
partners had contributed capital to the firm [or] written articles of partnership were used.”).
28. STORY, supra note 15, at 2.
29. Id. at 1.
30. 3 KENT, supra note 14, at 2.
31. 2 id. at 215.
32. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 366–70 (Bos., Charles C.
Little & James Brown, 3d ed. 1850); 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 167. Late in the nineteenth
century, some states adopted statutes allowing lawsuits in the partnership’s name. PARSONS &
BEALE, supra note 18, at 333–34.
33. STORY, supra note 32, at 341–44. I deliberately use “him” to describe partners, as almost
all were men in this era, though women partners were not unknown, which created interesting
issues; for example, when a female partner wed, the common law held this dissolved the
partnership because she lost her autonomous status, though the rule changed over the nineteenth
century. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 23–27 (Bos., Little,
Brown & Co. 1867).
34. EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 297–99 (1929).
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whose more flexible standards allowed partners to bring claims against
one another. 35
That said, there were elements of partnership law that were
difficult to explain were the partnership really no more than a contract
among partners. These gave the partnership a kind of flimsy legal
substance apart from its partners, making its operations easier but also
rendering partnership doctrine less coherent than might have been
expected given the law’s age and the partnership’s ubiquity. 36 One was
the so-called “jingle rule” of partnership bankruptcy. 37 Dating back to
the seventeenth century, 38 the jingle rule applied in cases of insolvency
and distinguished the assets of the partnership from those of the
individual partners, giving the partnership’s creditors a prior claim to
the partnership’s assets and an individual partner’s creditor a prior
claim to that partner’s assets. 39 Only after the partnership’s creditors
were satisfied could remaining partnership assets be divided among
individual partners’ creditors, and vice versa. 40 (In terminology recently
developed by Hansmann and Kraakman, the rule provided “weak entity
shielding” for the partnership. 41)
Another area where the partnership appeared to have substance
apart from individual partners was partnership property. A
partnership’s real or personal property was typically titled in the name
of natural persons, usually the partners, as the partnership was not a
legal person capable of holding property. 42 If a partnership’s property
were no more than property owned collectively by the partners,
however, it would presumably be held in one of the long-established
35. STORY, supra note 32, at 344; PARSONS & BEALE, supra note 18, at 475 (“[T]he great
majority of interesting questions concerning partnership fall within the jurisdiction of equity.”).
On the partnership in English law, see HARRIS, supra note 11, at 141–43; and TELEVANTOS, supra
note 13, at 26–28.
36. Works making clear that the common law partnership had aspects that would lead the
law occasionally to treat it as distinct from its partners include Getzler & Macnair, supra note 17,
at 10; Hansmann et al., supra note 7, at 1379–83; and Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as
Commitment Device, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1327–42 (2017).
37. Getzler & Macnair, supra note 17, at 10–11; TELEVANTOS, supra note 13, at 145–69.
38. Getzler & Macnair, supra note 17, at 11–12 (citing Craven v. Knight (1682) 21 Eng. Rep.
664, 2 Ch. Rep. 226).
39. Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 812 (2009)
(summarizing the jingle rule). The classic statement of the rule was in Ex parte Cook, (1728) 24
Eng. Rep. 834, 2 Peere Williams 500, and was also cited in Getzler & Macnair, supra note 17, at
12. In the United States, the rule applied until it was rejected in the Bankrupcty Act of 1978 and
afterwards in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997). Squire, supra, at 845 n.100.
40. This sounds simple, but could become quite complex, particularly when there were
successive partnerships operating a business. See TELEVANTOS, supra note 13, at 22–26, 149–69.
41. Hansmann et al., supra note 7, at 1381–82.
42. PARSONS & BEALE, supra note 18, at 351–54. Who held title to the property was not
dispositive as to whether it was partnership property. See id.
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forms of common ownership, either joint tenancy or tenancy in common.
But were this so, a partner could transfer his direct interest in the
partnership’s property to a third party, therefore giving a partner’s
creditor direct access to partnership property, or, were it held in a joint
tenancy, would leave a deceased partner’s interest not with his heirs or
devisees but with the surviving partners—none of which partners
wanted. 43 So special rules developed for partnership property; Story
and Kent both described partners as holding partnership property in
joint tenancy, but joint tenancy without survivorship rights so long as
the partnership lasted (a partner’s heirs had some claim on the
partnership, but not directly on the partnership property). 44 Thus,
while it is correct to state that the partnership was not a legal person,
stopping there would leave us with a mistaken impression of how
partnership law functioned. Best to follow the advice of one legal
historian and “enquire behind the label . . . in order to find out what it
actually involves.” 45
II. ENTITY OR AGGREGATE? PARTNERSHIP LAW REFORM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
For much of the nineteenth century, these lurking
contradictions did not pose a problem for partnership law. This is not
because the partnership was unimportant; quite the contrary. While
use of the corporation expanded over the nineteenth century in both
England and the United States, helped along by statutory reform, 46
partnerships remained dominant in many industries. In the United
States, the partnership remained “the most common choice for small
and medium-sized enterprises [ ] with multiple owners.” 47 As late as
43. STORY, supra note 15, at 121–26.
44. Id.; 2 KENT, supra note 31, at 14–15.
45. Laura Macgregor, Partnerships and Legal Personality: Cautionary Tales from Scotland,
20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 237, 238 (2020).
46. In the United States, the number of corporations increased since early in the nineteenth
century, even before general incorporation law made incorporation available without special
legislative approval. See ROBERT WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION 58–59 (2013) (finding over
twenty-two thousand specially chartered corporations in antebellum America). In England, the
passage of a series of reform acts, culminating in the Companies Act 1862, led to a rapid increase
in incorporations. David Chan Smith, The Mid-Victorian Reform of Britain’s Company Laws and
the Moral Economy of Fair Competition, 17 ENTER. & SOC’Y 1, 2 & n.1 (2020) (“More than 5,000
companies registered as corporations in England during the decade following the watershed acts
of 1855–1856 compared to 910 during the preceding period.”); Michael Lobban, Joint Stock
Companies, in 12 OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 1820-1914 PRIVATE LAW 613, 625–
31 (Cornish et al. eds., 2010) (“In 1865, 1063 companies were registered, while the years 1872–74
saw an average of 1014 companies founded annually.”).
47. Howard Bodenhorn, Partnership Fragility and Credit Costs 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 16689, 2011). Even large industrial enterprises could be organized as
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1900, the U.S. Census of Manufactures reported that a majority of “all
manufacturing establishments owned by more than one person were
partnerships.” 48 In England, not until the end of the century did a
“sizable proportion of sole traders, family businesses, and partnerships
move into joint-stock incorporated form.” 49
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, English
and American partnership law diverged, less in substance than in how
lawyers viewed the law. As is well known, English corporate (company)
law was a major topic for debate and reform from the 1820s to the
1860s, with significant reforms instituted in the series of statutes from
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 to the Companies Act 1862. 50
Reforms were also attempted in English partnership law from the
1830s to the 1850s, but most of these reform attempts sputtered out; it
was the reform of joint-stock company law that in the end proved more
consequential for partnerships, as laws transitioned joint stock
companies away from their existence as an amalgam of partnership and
trust law towards the modern company (corporate) form. 51 The
companies acts did impact partnerships, beginning with the 1844 Act’s
requirement that all partnerships with more than twenty-five members
register, effectively capping the size of partnerships, but the reform
efforts left the common law of partnerships largely untouched. 52 When
partnership law was given statutory form in the Partnership Act 1890,
drafted by Sir Frederick Pollock, that act was not seen as radical but
merely one of a series of acts codifying and standardizing the
preexisting common law rather than altering it. 53
partnerships. See Blair, supra note 7, at 452–53 (citing JOHN K. BROWN, THE BALDWIN
LOCOMOTIVE WORKS, 1831-1915: A STUDY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE (1995)).
48. Naomi Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility:
A Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States During the
Era of Industrialization, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28, 38 (2005).
49. Joshua Getzler, Company Law: English Common Law, in OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009).
50. The history is extensive. For a quick overview, see Lobban, supra note 46, at 625–31.
51. On attempts to reform partnership law during this period, and particularly to adopt the
limited liability partnership, see Smith, supra note 46; and Lobban, supra note 46, at 614–19
(detailing turbulent nature of pre-1860 reform efforts).
52. See HARRIS, supra note 11, at 282–85 (discussing the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844).
Initially the law also required companies with limited liability to have at least twenty-five
members, but that number was soon dropped to seven and, after the decision in Salomon v.
Salomon, a company could effectively be incorporated with a single member. PAUL L. DAVIES &
SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 5 (9th ed. 2012)
(citing Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22). The cap on the number of
partners has in recent years been lifted for many professional partnerships. Id.
53. Pollock was clear that the 1890 Act was meant to codify existing law, rather than alter it.
FREDERICK POLLOCK, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP: INCORPORATING THE PARTNERSHIP
ACT, 1890, at iv–ix (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 5th ed. 1890). The one notable change to common
law in the 1890 Act was the adoption of the charging order as a remedy for a partner’s creditor.

2021]

THE PERSONIFICATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP

1845

In the United States debates over partnership law took a
different form. Reform was on the agenda, as the growth of a national
market and the quest for uniformity between jurisdictions led to
proposals to standardize a number of areas of law. Partnership law
became a major area for contention beginning in the 1880s, as wouldbe reformers split into two camps based on their underlying notion of
what a partnership was. Advocates of the “entity” view of the
partnership (also called the “mercantile” view, purportedly held by
businessmen) contended the law should treat the partnership as a
separate legal person. Arrayed against them were advocates of the
“aggregate” view (also called the “common law” view, allegedly held by
lawyers), who defended the traditional view of the partnership as a
mere association lacking legal substance. Each would eventually seek
to have their view codified in the Uniform Partnership Act.
If we treat this as a mere question of intellectual genealogy, the
origins of aggregate/entity debate in partnership law are easy to find.
They can be traced back to the 1830s, when an English barrister and
polymath, Isaac Cory, wrote an early work on accounting, A Practical
Treatise on Accounts, where he argued that the lawyers’ view of the
partnership was completely at odds with the views of merchants and
therefore wrong. 54 According to Cory, while the law viewed a
partnership as effectively a way for separate individuals to hold
property in common, as a “joint tenancy without benefit of
survivorship . . . . The [m]ercantile notion of a partnership is simply,
that it is a kind of CORPORATION,” existing apart from its partners. 55
That is how, he pointed out, partnerships were treated by accountants,
who kept separate entries for the partners and the partnership in their
books. Cory died soon after publishing his work, but his argument was
picked up by the midcentury Victorian barrister and reformer John
Malcolm Ludlow. 56 Echoing Cory, Ludlow highlighted what he saw as
the common law view’s shortcomings. To the businessman, he wrote,
the partnership appeared a separate entity “for whom the individual
See id. at 67–68. On codification during this period, see JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 233–34 (5th ed. 2019).
54. ISAAC PRESTON CORY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON ACCOUNTS 67–90 (London, William
Pickering, 2d ed. 1839); see also M. C. Curthoys, Isaac Preston Cory, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L
BIOGRAPHY, https://www.oxforddnb.com (last updated Jan. 3, 2008) [https://perma.cc/Z64B-UXEQ]
(also available in print).
55. CORY, supra note 54, at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Ludlow wanted the limited partnership adopted, as he saw it as a business form offering
investment opportunities to the middle class. Smith, supra note 46, at 15–20; see also Lobban,
supra note 46, at 627 (“[W]anted limited liability to be available to all joint stock companies, and
not merely ones with large capitals . . . .”); E.R. Norman & H. C. G. Matthew, John Malcolm Forbes
Ludlow, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY (Sept. 23, 2004), https://www.oxforddnb.com
[https://perma.cc/LP95-HKX3] (also available in print).

1846

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1835

partners are agents at once and sureties.” 57 But the common law “could
not recognise the personality of the firm. The only ideal persons it
knows of are corporations. . . . [T]o admit that Jack and Tom, by
clubbing together [ten pounds] each, can make an ideal person called a
firm, was more than any Common Law imagination could reach.” 58
Absurdities followed. The common law described partnership
property as a joint tenancy without survivorship rights, which Ludlow
described as “about as rational an expression as a round square, or a
dark light.” 59 Some partnership rules only made sense if the
partnership had an existence separate from the partners, such as the
rule that allowed the partnership to be bound by bills endorsed by a
single partner. “But when the law has thus recognised the firm for the
purpose of fixing [this] liability, it suddenly shuts its eyes upon it for
the purpose of enforcing it,” requiring all partners be named in a suit to
collect on such a bill. 60 Neither courts of law nor equity, he complained,
would “notice, otherwise than by side-glances, the mercantile
personality of the firm.” 61 As Ludlow saw it this was a failure of the law,
as “[t]he firm is a reality in all commercial transactions, whether the
law acknowledge or ignore it.” 62 Ludlow’s views were extensively
discussed in Lindley on Partnership, which was widely read on both
sides of the Atlantic, 63 and Lindley was generally credited for
popularizing the entity theory. 64
Here we find the split between England and the United States.
In England, the gap between the common law and mercantile views of
the partnership was well recognized, but was just accepted as a fact
about the law. Lindley, who eventually was a Law Lord as well as the
leading authority on partnership law, simply stated in his treatise that
the merchants’ view was “not the legal notion of a firm.” 65 When Sir
Frederick Pollock, a student of Lindley’s, drafted the Partnership Act
1890 he adopted the common law “aggregate” view with little analysis,
57. John Malcolm Ludlow, On the Mercantile Notion of “the Firm,” and Its Need for Legal
Recognition, in 2 PAPERS READ BEFORE THE JURIDICAL SOCIETY, 1858–1863, at 40, 41 (London,
William Maxwell 1863).
58. Id. at 42.
59. Id. at 43.
60. Id. at 52.
61. Id. at 54.
62. Id. at 67.
63. 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 163–75. Lindley’s work was widely cited in the United States
as well as in England, including in several U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning with Ivinson
v. Hutton, 98 U.S. 79, 80 (1878).
64. See, e.g., Francis v. McNeil, 228 U.S. 695, 699 (1913) (“Since Cory on Accounts was made
more famous by Lindley on Partnership, the notion that the firm is an entity distinct from its
members had grown in popularity . . . .”).
65. 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 164.
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the Act’s first section defining a partnership as “the relation which
subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view
of profit.” 66 Decades later Lindley would wish English law had taken
more cognizance of the issue and adopted the entity approach, but after
Cory and Ludlow no voices were raised in England calling for radical
change. 67 This despite the fact that the English lawyers had a ready
model for an alternative approach in Scottish law, which did treat the
partnership as a separate legal entity. 68 We can only speculate as to
why Cory’s and Ludlow’s calls for reform found no support in England.
It may be that, unlike in the United States, by the late nineteenth
century it was fairly easy for English businessmen dissatisfied with the
partnership form to incorporate their businesses while retaining many
desirable features of the partnership, so that no large constituency for
reform of partnership law ever developed. 69
In the United States, in contrast, demand for reform of
partnership law, and for resolution of the aggregate/entity issue, grew
toward the end of the nineteenth century. As mentioned, in good part
this derived from a broader push for standardization of commercial law
across the states. As the legal historian Lawrence Friedman explained
it, during this period “[m]any legal scholars, and some business people,
raised a cry for uniformity, or at least some form of harmonization. It
seemed wrong, and inefficient, in a national market, to have fifty
different forms of commercial law.” 70 When the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) was founded in 1878, one reason given was the
need to develop uniform state laws. 71
66. Partnership Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, § 1(1) (UK). The 1890 Act did retain the jingle
rule, and in one break with the United States prevented partners from dissolving a partnership
for a term. See id. § 32. Importantly, it also carved out an exception for Scottish law’s different
rule. Id. § 4(2).
67. 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 4 (7th ed. 1905). Lindley identified that the “non-recognition
of the firm was a defect in the law of partnership” and “regretted that the Partnership Act has not
gone further than it has in the direction of assimilating the English law to the Scotch. Had it done
so, the difficulties of suing and being sued, and of dealing with partners abroad, would have been
greatly diminished.” Id.
68. For more on the partnership in Scottish law, see Macgregor, supra note 45, at 247–55.
69. For instance, English company law during this period was sufficiently flexible that
businessmen dissatisfied with what partnership law offered could fairly easily register their firms.
See L. C. B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporate Law, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1369, 1371–72 (1956); Ron Harris & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Opening the Black Box of the
Common Law Legal Regime, 61 BUS. HIST. 1199, 1200 (2019) (“[T]he Companies Acts were laissezfaire in spirit, giving incorporators almost complete freedom to set up the governance structures
of their businesses as they saw fit.”); Ron Harris, The Private Origins of the Private Company, 33
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 352 (2013) (noting a “dramatic turn . . . in the use of the corporate
form” by smaller companies during this period).
70. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 744 (4th ed. 2019).
71. See ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION (2013).
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Partnership law was one area where American law was
decidedly not uniform. Retrospective accounts of partnership law in the
nineteenth century give it a consistency it did not always possess. While
its broad outlines were the same from state to state, rules differed in
many particulars. To give two examples concerning basic rules of
partnership law, while the jingle rule of partnership insolvency was
adopted in most states, a few rejected it, 72 and while many courts had
voiced the familiar rule that a partnership for a term could always be
dissolved by the act of a single partner, other state courts held a partner
lacked that power. 73 Apart from jurisdictional variations, there were
other areas where doctrinal inconsistency produced uncertainty in the
law. There was, for instance, no universally accepted test for
determining whether a partnership had been formed absent an explicit
agreement between the partners. 74 Nor was it clear what justified the
jingle rule’s separation of partners’ and partnership property if the
partnership had no legal existence apart from the partners; nor were
authorities settled on when property became partnership property and
how to describe it (was partnership property a form of joint tenancy or
tenancy in common, or something else entirely?). 75
Reform of the law promised both to smooth out state
variations—especially problematic for firms operating across state
lines—and to resolve underlying confusions in the law. As the eventual
drafter of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) explained it, summing up
why he thought a uniform statute necessary:
There are two factors which have led to the desire for a Uniform Partnership Act; the lack
of uniformity in the law of partnership in the several states, and its uncertainty in any
given state. It is not difficult to demonstrate that uniformity among the several states in
the law of partnership is desirable. The business conditions under which partnerships are
conducted are similar throughout the United States. There is, therefore, no reason arising
from diverse economic conditions in different states why the law of partnership should
not be uniform. . . . But the principal reason why uniformity in the law of partnership is
desirable, is that a considerable proportion of existing partnerships do business in more
than one state. . . . An act in the business intended to have an effect on the business as a
whole should have the same effect in all jurisdictions in which the business is carried
on. 76

72. PARSONS & BEALE, supra note 18, at 476–77.
73. See Benjamin F. Rex, Power of Partners to Withdraw at Will from Partnerships Entered
into for a Definite Period, 32 AM. L. REG. 689, 692–96 (1884).
74. See, e.g., George Wharton Pepper, What Constitutes a Partnership?, 46 AM. L. REG. 137,
137–39 (1898) (discussing varying viewpoints on the essential elements of a partnership).
75. See, e.g., Francis M. Burdick, Partnership Realty, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 197, 202 (1909)
(detailing the different views).
76. William Draper Lewis, The Desirability of Expressing the Law of Partnership in Statutory
Form, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (1911).
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Most often, those pushing reform advocated for the entity
approach, which would acknowledge the partnership as a legal person
apart from its partners, giving it, for instance, title to partnership
property and the ability to sue and be sued in its own name. It was the
practical effects of legal personhood on partnership rules, not its
theoretical implications, which most interested these reformers.
Adopting legal personhood promised to bring coherence to the law.
Concerning, for example, the challenge of distinguishing a
partnership’s obligations from the obligations of its individual partners,
one widely cited article stated that
[t]he moment the personality of the firm is recognized, all difficulty vanishes. An
obligation of all the partners, in a matter not purporting to be firm business, is no more
the obligation of the firm than an independent undertaking of all the stockholders in a
corporation is the undertaking of the corporation. 77

As to the confused status of partnership property, a comment in
the Harvard Law Review claimed that once partnership law was
“adapt[ed] . . . to the custom of merchants,” clarity would appear. 78 “It
will be held that the firm owns the capital and may be sued by any
partner, while the death of a partner will not necessitate a
dissolution[,]” it argued. 79 “The books will show whether property
belongs to the firm, or is rented to it by a partner, and the firm creditors
will have as large a share as a personal creditor of the assets of a
partner.” 80
Before going further, we should acknowledge a strange fact
about this brewing dispute: running alongside the debates over whether
the partnership was an entity or aggregate was a similar debate over
whether the corporation was an entity or aggregate (in turn only one
episode in long-running debates over corporate personhood). 81 At the
same time that some partnership experts were pushing for the law to
define the partnership as an entity, many corporate lawyers were
pushing for the law to treat the corporation as an aggregate, sometimes
even comparing the corporation to a partnership. 82 (These corporation
law scholars appear to have ignored the possibility the partnership was
not an aggregate.) Surprisingly, there seems to have been little direct
77. William Hamilton Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 CENT. L.J. 343, 351 (1903).
78. Recent Cases, Partnership—Entity Theory, 10 HARV. L. REV. 245, 250 (1896).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. For surveys of these debates, see, for example, HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 65–108; Mark,
supra note 2, at 1455–78; Millon, supra note 2, at 205–20; and WINKLER, supra note 6, at 71–161.
82. See, e.g., 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, at iii
(Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1886) (“[A] corporation is really an association formed by the
agreement of its shareholders, and [ ] the existence of a corporation as an entity . . . is a
fiction . . . .”); see also Mark, supra note 2, at 1444–46.
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connection between these debates. 83 The late nineteenth-century
corporate debates were ways of addressing the very pressing, very
public issue of how the new giant business corporations, especially
railroads, were to be regulated. Traditionally, corporations were viewed
as creations of the state, which made it easy to justify state regulation. 84
In the 1880s, however, other theories about the corporation appeared,
including a theory that the corporation was in essence an aggregate,
and should be treated chiefly as an association of the natural persons
who were its shareholders. 85 Were this the case, so the argument went,
corporate regulation would directly impinge on those individuals’
contractual and property rights and thus should be subject to searching
constitutional scrutiny. 86 To be sure, there were limits to the
corporation-as-aggregate approach. Advocates of the aggregate theory
of the corporation did not want the corporation treated as an aggregate
in all respects; no one argued for ending limited liability, for example,
or titling corporate property in the shareholders’ names. The argument
was deployed strategically, as a way to win corporations greater
protections, and it is not unfair to summarize the arguments as “the
corporation should be treated as an aggregate when regulated, but as a
separate legal person for most other purposes.” Nor was the aggregate
theory the only one being put forward; still other scholars argued that
the corporation was a “real entity,” a creation not of the state but of its
owners, albeit with an existence apart from them. 87
The corporate and partnership debates over aggregate and
entity thus turned on very different issues. The corporation debates
were certainly about the corporation, but also about how corporations
were to be regulated by the state and how their power would be tamed.
The partnership debates focused on the partnership itself and what the
internal rules governing partnerships should be. The debates also drew
on different streams of legal thought. While the corporate debates had
some roots in American traditions and borrowed the common law belief
that the partnership was an aggregate, they also drew on scholarly and
83. Though both debates, it should be noted, occurred during a period when modernization
seemed to have eroded the link between individuals and traditional communities, raising new
questions about the status of individuals and groups. See, e.g., Lamoreaux, supra note 8, at 43
(identifying in this period “an increased tendency to think about groups, regardless of size or
function, as being more than the sum of their parts, as having identities, indeed personalities”);
THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 15–45 (1982); CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 139–43 (1991); ROBERT WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 44–75 (1967).
84. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 65–107.
85. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 6, at 1887; Mark, supra note 2, at 1461–62.
86. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 6, at 1887–88.
87. Mark, supra note 2, at 1464–78.
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philosophical disputes originating in Germany over the nature of
collective bodies. As the legal historian Ron Harris has shown, those
debates can be tracked by following German political theorist Otto von
Gierke’s “real entity” theory of the corporation from Germany, to the
United Kingdom, to the United States. 88 When it arrived in the United
States, the real entity theory became entangled in the domestic political
disputes over government regulation. 89 The debate over the nature of
the partnership had different roots. As shown above, it traced back to
the Victorian legal reformers Cory and Ludlow and was transmitted to
the United States via Lindley’s Treatise, a work summarizing doctrinal
law. 90 American partnership debates largely avoided the philosophical
speculation that marked the corporate debates, and in them European
theorists received barely a mention. Furthermore, the partnership
disputants were firmly convinced that their dispute had practical
consequences for the day-to-day operations of partnerships. As the
great contracts scholar Samuel Williston saw it, there was “perhaps no
considerable subject in the law in which a single fundamental but
disputed principle makes so marked a difference in the conclusions
reached, as is the case in the law of partnership.” 91 Whichever approach
was adopted promised to answer “[v]ery many of the troublesome
questions involved in that branch of the law.” 92
That said, it is still striking how rarely advocates for the entity
view of partnership mentioned the corporation. Fifty years earlier Cory
had proclaimed that the mercantile (entity) view was that the
partnership was simply “a kind of CORPORATION,” but this claim
disappeared in the American context. 93 Most likely it did so because the
corporation was not very popular in turn-of-the-century America, and
was the frequent target for withering attacks. If the entity theory meant
that the partnership was merely a kind of corporation, that would be
ready ammunition for its opponents. So we rarely hear advocates for
the entity view mention the corporation, much less argue that the
88. See Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism to American Big Business, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2006). It’s possible of course that the influence of theory on
practice was exaggerated; one acerbic contemporary claimed that the disputants over corporate
personality strove “to exaggerate the importance of those questions, in order to pose as great
reformers engaged in a gigantic task of emancipating the legal world from the thralldom of
mediaeval superstition.” Id. at 1423 (quoting Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24
HARV. L. REV. 253, 253 (1911)).
89. Harris, supra note 88, at 1466–74.
90. See 1 LINDLEY, supra note 16.
91. Samuel Williston, The Uniform Partnership Act with Some Remarks on Other Uniform
Commercial Laws, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 196, 207 (1915).
92. Id.
93. CORY, supra note 54, at 71.
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partnership was a kind of corporation—though as we shall see,
opponents of the entity view eventually drew the connection and argued
that the aggregate view was preferable in part because it would draw a
sharp line between the partnership and the corporation.
In American law, the reformers’ claim that a partnership should
be viewed as an entity rather than an aggregate began to gain traction
in the 1880s. 94 In 1881 a lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania
could state that a partnership was simply “an aggregate of
individuals[ ]—a collective name for individuals.” 95 In 1888, a standard
treatise, Bates on Partnership, repeated this, but here we find a change,
for the work also stated that “[s]hould it be determined in the future
that a partnership is an entity distinct from the persons composing it,
my definition should not describe it as a relation but as a union or
body.” 96 By 1893 another major treatise, Parsons on Partnership, edited
by Harvard Law School’s Joseph H. Beale, embraced the new approach,
announcing that “[p]artnership is a legal entity.” 97 Beale justified this
innovation by echoing Cory in pointing to accountants’ practice of
treating the partners and partnership separately when keeping
partnership books, and by claiming that “[s]ince the law of partnership
is founded upon the law merchant, that is, the custom of merchants, we
should expect to find the mercantile conception of a partnership
recognized by the law.” 98 While acknowledging that in American law
“the partnership has not been clearly recognized as an entity,” he
continued that “at law certain doctrines are held which can be
consistently explained only by recognizing the firm as an entity.” 99
Thus, there had developed “a strong disposition on the part of the courts
to recognize the mercantile doctrine.” 100 The mention of the law
merchant is telling, for at the time many believed that English
partnership law had its roots in this allegedly transnational body of
medieval commercial law which had over time been incorporated into
the common law. 101 Were that the case, then proponents of the entity
94. A few isolated cases from before 1880 referred to the partnership as a separate entity, but
it seems to have entered the broader legal discourse only after this date. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Corsett, 39 Mich. 777, 784 (1878) (“The partnership for most legal purposes is a distinct entity.”).
95. The Partnership During Its Continuance, or the Rights, Powers, and Liabilites of
Partners (Lecture X, Nov. 14, 1881), in NOTES OF PROF. JAMES PARSONS’ LECTURES ON
PARTNERSHIPS, CORPORATIONS AND BAILMENT 36 (comp. by Frederick M. Leonard, 1882).
96. 1 CLEMENT BATES, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 2 (Chi., T. H. Flood & Co. 1888).
97. PARSONS & BEALE, supra note 18, at 1.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Whether this is an accurate description of what occurred is disputed. See JOHN BAKER,
‘Law Merchant’ as a Source of English Law, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS ON ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
1263, 1274–82 (2013) (“It is a myth, therefore, to suppose that there was at some point in history
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theory were just asking that partnership law be conformed to
merchants’ practices, as it had been before.
Those pushing the entity theory argued not only that courts
should adopt the entity approach, but that courts had already begun to
do so. Given that there were elements of partnership law that
distinguished between the partnership and the partners, it was not
difficult to find passages in older cases seeming to accept the entity
theory. A New York case from 1832 was unearthed that asserted a
partnership “constitutes but one person in law.” 102 In 1870 the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he partnership is a distinct thing from
the partners themselves,” 103 and a few state courts made similar
statements over the next two decades. 104 One widely cited case was
English. In Pooley v Driver, the respected judge Sir George Jessel wrote
that partnership law only made sense from an entity standpoint. “You
cannot grasp the notion of agency properly speaking, unless you grasp
the notion of the existence of the firm as a separate entity from the
existence of the partners . . . .” 105 More cases making similar assertions
soon appeared, leading one author to identify an “unconscious instinct
in [the] courts towards treating a firm as an entity.” 106
Reformers could also point to other legal developments
supporting the entity approach, most significant the adoption of new
rules for partnership bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the first
national bankruptcy law in almost thirty years, 107 explicitly adopted the
jingle rule distinguishing the partnership’s assets from the partners’, 108
and also included two other provisions taken to embrace the entity
approach: it defined a partnership as a “person” under the Act, 109 and
provided for the possibility that a partnership could be declared

a comprehensive body of mercantile law current throughout the world . . . waiting to be
incorporated . . . .”); see also Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1153 (2012).
102. Warner v. Griswold, 8 Wend. 665, 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (allowing a law partnership
to sue a former client in the name of only one partner). Many articles gathered these cases. See,
e.g., Note, The Partnership as an Entity, 15 IOWA L. REV. 186 (1930).
103. Forsyth v. Woods, 78 U.S. 484, 486 (1870) (dealing with priority of liens against partners
and partnership).
104. See, e.g., Campbell v. Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Bank, 68 N.W. 344, 346 (Neb. 1896) (noting,
in the context of a transfer of assets between firms, that “[a] partnership is a distinct entity, having
its own property, debts, and credits”).
105. Pooley v. Driver [1876] 5 Ch D 458 at 471 (UK). This was, it appears, pure dicta.
106. 1 BATES, supra note 96, at 175–76.
107. On the adoption of the 1898 Act, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 23–47 (2001).
108. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 5, 30 Stat. 544.
109. Id. § 1(19), 30 Stat. at 544.
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bankrupt even if some of its partners remained solvent. 110 Together
these provisions were taken to be a “radical change in the theory of the
nature of a partnership.” 111 This produced a wave of federal court
opinions which, after a little initial wavering, clearly adopted the entity
theory—at least when interpreting federal bankruptcy law. 112
Yet case law from the 1880s into the new century remained
divided, and while the entity approach seemed to be gaining ground,
defenders of the aggregate approach fought doggedly against it. One
author, having quoted from numerous cases approving the entity theory
of partnership, then confessed that
it is quite as easy to make up from these jurisdictions just cited and from others equally
weighty, a similar list of authorities to the effect that the property of a firm is the property
of the partners, and the debts of a firm are the debts of the partners, and common law
courts know nothing about any entity in a partnership other than the individuals who
compose it. 113

Some jurisdictions explicitly rejected the innovation, and not
merely because of judicial conservatism. The entity approach, a few
courts insisted, would disrupt something vital: the direct link between
a partner and a creditor of the partnership. 114 In 1891 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed a bank to apply
collateral provided by a partner to satisfy his partnership’s debt, noting
that, while “Cory on Accounts and Lindley on Partnership have made it
popular to refer to a mercantile distinction between the firm and its
members. . . . we have no doubt that our merchants are perfectly aware
that claims against their firms are claims against them.” 115 Five years
later in Hughes v. Gross then-Massachusetts Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes held that “the common law does not know the firm as an
entity . . . [and a] contract with a firm is a contract with the members
who compose it.” 116 One article highlighted these and other
Massachusetts cases which “scornfully repudiated, as an academic
refinement, or as a logician’s subtility, the idea of a partnership existing
as a separate legal being, much in the same fashion as a corporation,
110. The situations would be rare, but this could occur where, for instance, one partner was a
minor or insane and so could not be declared bankrupt. See William J. Shroder, Distribution of
Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners, 18 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 (1905).
111. Id. at 497.
112. But see Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695, 700–02 (1913) (holding that although
bankruptcy law “recognize[s] the firm as an entity for certain purposes . . . the firm remains at
common law a group of men”).
113. Cowles, supra note 77, at 343. For other examples of cases on both sides of the question,
see 1 SCOTT ROWLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 119–23 (1916).
114. See, e.g., Hallowell v. Blackstone Nat’l Bank, 28 N.E. 281, 282 (Mass. 1891).
115. Id.
116. Hughes v. Gross, 43 N.E. 1031, 1032 (Mass. 1896) (citation omitted).
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apart from the existence of the different copartners.” 117 Decisions from
other states were more nuanced, stating that a partnership was an
entity for some purposes but not others, or cautioning that calling a
partnership an entity did not make it so in the eyes of the law. In 1908
the Indiana Supreme Court explained that “[e]xpressions [that]” “a
partnership is a legal entity. . . . are not infrequently found in the cases”
but it warned that “in thus speaking the courts have referred to
partnerships as legal entities merely as a term of accommodation . . . .
Such statements cannot be accepted as affording a sufficient foundation
for the view that a partnership is not composed of its individual
members.” 118
The push and pull frustrated backers of the entity approach, who
blamed the nation’s jurisdictional fragmentation and the common law’s
inherent conservatism for the holdup in adopting what they believed
the superior approach. “A legal system actually as adaptable as the
common law claims to be,” wrote one, “would not have required two
hundred years to adjust itself to a view so advantageous practically, and
so unexceptionable legally, no matter how novel.” 119
III. ENTITY AND AGGREGATE IN THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
Debates over the nature of the partnership came to a head when
work began on the Uniform Partnership Act. Drafting of uniform acts
had begun in the early 1890s under the aegis of the ABA, which led to
the formation in 1892 of the Commission on Uniform State Laws (later
the National Commission of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, or
“NCCUSL,” and now the Uniform Law Commission, or “ULC”). 120 It
produced its first uniform act, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, in 1896. 121 Partnership law was clearly on the agenda, and in 1903
Sir Frederick Pollock, drafter of the United Kingdom’s Partnership Act
1890, spoke at the Commission’s annual meeting and urged them to
begin work on an American uniform law for partnership. 122 That year
117. Lee M. Friedman, Some Recent Massachusetts Decisions in Partnership, 32 AM. L. REV.
244, 244 (1898).
118. State v. Krasher, 83 N.E. 498, 500 (Ind. 1908).
119. Cowles, supra note 77, at 348. For more recent observations that the conservatism of the
common law can hold back adoption of new business forms, see Timothy W. Guinnane, Ron Harris,
Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Putting the Corporation in Its Place, 8 ENTER. &
SOC’Y 687, 718 (2007); Lamoreaux, supra note 8, at 31.
120. See STEIN, supra note 71, at 13–14.
121. Id. at 18. Not all proposed acts were drafted, and not all drafted were adopted by many
states. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY 1900-1933, at 95–97 (1990).
122. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 5, 8 (1903) [hereinafter
1903 NATIONAL CONFERENCE HANDBOOK].
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the Commission proposed to begin work on a uniform partnership act
without, it appears, any real dissent, though a few worried voices were
raised; a comment in the Harvard Law Review from this period argued
that “in its present state of flux it would be a great mistake to attempt
to codify” partnership law, as this could interrupt the trend towards
adoption of “the mercantile view of the nature of a partnership.” 123 But
such objections were ignored, and in 1903 the Commission decided to
go ahead with a Uniform Partnership Act and asked the dean of the
Harvard Law School, James Barr Ames, to draft it. 124
Ames was to be a pivotal figure in the debates over the nature of
the partnership. Today he is best remembered as an emanation of the
Harvard Law School. He enrolled at the Law School in 1870, the year
Christopher Columbus Langdell became dean and began teaching using
the case method; joined the faculty upon graduation; succeeded
Langdell as dean in 1895; and remained there until his death in 1910. 125
Ames was a legal historian, but also taught partnership law and may
have authored the first casebook in the field (he is credited with naming
the rule of insolvency priority the “jingle rule”). 126 Most important for
this Article, he was the leading American exponent of the entity theory,
and his appointment seemed to foreshadow that view’s triumph. 127
How Ames came to champion the entity view calls for a quick
detour into the history and myths of American legal education, for
Ames’s views appear to have come straight from his mentor Langdell.
Today Langdell is remembered as a dry arch-formalist, devoted to
distilling legal rules from appellate opinions alone. 128 Yet as the
historian Bruce Kimball has recently discovered, when he first began
teaching—with Ames as one of his first students—Langdell took a more
empirical approach. 129 Among his subjects was partnership law, and
123. J. D. B., The Partnership as a Legal Entity, 17 HARV. L. REV. 207, 208 (1904).
124. 1903 NATIONAL CONFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 122, at 4.
125. See Joseph H. Beale, James Barr Ames—His Life and Character, 23 HARV. L. REV. 325,
325 (1910); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 290–309 (2013).
126. Frank R. Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610, 630
n.86 (1960). See generally JAMES BARR AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP,
1881-1887 (Cambridge, Mass., Riverside Press 1893).
127. See, e.g., PARSONS & BEALE, supra note 18, at 1–4.
128. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980S 52–53 (1983); G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of
Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4–6 (1997). This view has recently been
challenged. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C. C.
LANGDELL, 1826–1906 (2009).
129. See Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They
Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.
C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57, 60 (1999) (describing one student’s opinion that
Langdell was “more of a logician than a lawyer”).
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when trying to define partnership, Langdell insisted “that the legal
doctrine of partnership must be inferred from ‘careful observation’ of
extralegal factors, such as the practice of merchants.” 130 At one point
Langdell even told students that he was only “adopting and carrying
out the theory developed by Mr. Cory in his treatise on accounts”—the
entity theory of partnership. 131 What led Langdell to the entity view is
not clear, but it may have been the fact that before Harvard he spent a
dozen years in a commercial law practice in New York City, which
exposed him to merchants’ views of the partnership. 132 What is clear is
that Ames inherited the entity view from Langdell and transmitted it
to his own students; when Joseph Beale began teaching partnership law
at Harvard he used Ames’s notes, and recalled Ames concluding “in case
after case that the decision is absolutely inconsistent with any other
theory than that of entity.” 133 Decades later Judge Learned Hand, a
member of Harvard Law’s class of 1896, recalled learning from Ames
“how inadequate was the common law of partnership before the advent
of Cory on Accounts.” 134
In 1905, two years after being named drafter of the UPA, Ames
returned to the NCCUSL and explained more fully why he proposed to
draft the Act on the entity theory. 135 Echoing other advocates of the
entity approach, he argued that only a statute founded on that theory
could bring coherence to the law. Partnership law, he warned the
Commission, posed a particular challenge for a drafter, for while other
commercial laws might differ from state to state there “the distinctions
are not fundamental.” 136 That was not the case with partnership law,
whose basic rules varied between the states, which he attributed to the
unresolved theories of the partnership. “[A]lmost from the beginning of
the development of the law of partnership,” Ames announced, “there
has been a contest going on between the lawyers and the merchants.” 137
“The merchants have looked upon a partnership as a distinct
personality; . . . they look upon it as owning property and as contracting.
The lawyers, on the other hand, have steadily insisted that a

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 65.
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION 208 n.113 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958, at
77 (1958) (reminiscing about his time at Harvard).
135. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 23, 24 (1905).
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 25.
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partnership is simply a group of co-owners, co-obligors and
co-obligees.” 138
Many of the tangles he found in partnership law he blamed on
unthinking adherence to the aggregate approach, which clashed with
commercial realities. In no state, for example, could a firm hold real
property in its own name—a consequence of the aggregate approach. 139
What then should the rule be when such property was inadvertently
conveyed to a partnership in the firm’s name? “Where is the title to go?
Not having the mercantile principle to go upon, the courts have gone
apart in different jurisdictions.” 140 In eight states title was vested in the
named partners, in three it stayed with the grantor, while in seven title
vested in all the partners named and unnamed. “[A]ll those difficulties
will disappear at once if the mercantile conception is adopted.” 141 Or
what should occur when a partner’s creditor attempted to levy on the
partnership’s property? Due to the aggregate theory the property was
not titled in the firm’s name but that of the partners. If the partners
held the property as cotenants, then in seventeen states the creditor
could take “the legal title of the partner . . . upon execution or
attachment.” 142 In ten other states, however, the law held that a
partner’s creditor had no direct claim on partnership property, and “the
sheriff is a trespasser if he touches the firm’s property.” 143 “That
illustration brings out what we see continually in the law of
partnership, the courts professing to look upon the partnership from
the common law point of view and abandoning the principle in concrete
cases.” 144 Ames piled up example after example of how rules differed
from state to state, ranging from a partner’s power to demand partition
of firm real estate, to whether a partner’s widow has a dower right in
partnership real estate, to the rights of a firm’s creditors against the
estate of a deceased partner. 145
So great were the differences between states’ rules, he
concluded, that a uniform act would have to “sacrifice[ ] the law of
almost all of the states in many particulars,” and it was not “worth
while [sic] to attempt to draft a partnership act except upon some sound
fundamental principle,” which for him was “the mercantile conception

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. Ames did note that Louisiana took the entity approach.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26–28.
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of a partnership.” 146 It’s important to observe that for Ames the term
used mattered less than that the partnership would be given separate
legal existence and would serve as a locus for the firm’s legal
relationships:
I do not mean by that to say that it is necessary to state . . . that a partnership is a person.
That is a mere matter of detail. But what I should deem of fundamental importance would
be substantially this: That the partnership as such should be made the owner of the firm’s
property; the title at law should vest in the partnership as such; the partnership as such
should be treated as the obligor, and also as the obligee on firm contracts, and that actions
by or against the partners should be brought in the firm name. 147

He concluded by refusing to take any other approach. “[I]f the
Conference thinks my plan undesirable, I should much prefer to have
someone else draw the act . . . .” 148 The Commission unanimously
authorized Ames to draft the act on the entity theory. 149
In 1906 Ames produced a first draft of the Uniform Partnership
Act. 150 While borrowing heavily from the Partnership Act 1890, it broke
with the English approach by squarely adopting the entity theory,
defining the partnership as a “legal person” and adopting rules giving
the partnership separate legal existence. 151 Partnership property was
now to be titled in the name of the partnership. 152 A partnership for a
term or specific undertaking could not be dissolved by an individual
partner in violation of the partnership agreement, 153 and even the
common law rule that a partner’s death or bankruptcy would dissolve
the partnership was “[s]ubject to any agreement between the
partners.” 154 Partners would no longer be directly liable for partnership
debts; now partnership assets would have to be exhausted before a
separate proceeding could be brought against a partner (this did not
shield partners from liability, but added procedural hurdles for a
partnership creditor). 155 Two innovations not related to the entity
approach were also notable. Ames’s 1906 draft would have required all
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
This draft is appended to Proceedings, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE MEETING 237 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 DRAFT].
151. Id. at 239 (Sections 1 and 5).
152. Id. (Section 5(2)).
153. Id. at 247 (Section 32). A partner had the power to petition a court for dissolution in other
circumstances, such as when another partner “wilfuly [sic] and or persistently commits a breach
of the partnership agreement,” or when circumstances have arisen which “in the opinion of the
Court render it just and equitable that the partnership be dissolved.” Id. at 248 (Section 35).
154. Id. at 248 (Section 33).
155. Id. at 241 (Section 12).
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partnerships to publicly register by filing a certificate in the county
clerk’s office “stating the firm name of the partnership, the general
nature of its business, and the full name and residence of each member
of the partnership.” 156 It also adopted the English innovation that
limited an individual partner’s creditors to securing a “charging order”
against partnership property, replacing the confusing morass of older
rules that, in a few states, had allowed a partner’s creditors directly to
attach partnership property. 157 Ames’s draft did not abandon the
common law partnership wholesale, but neither did it just codify
preexisting rules.
The first response was largely positive; even partnership law
specialists who eventually turned against the entity theory initially
favored it, 158 and Ames continued the slow work of drafting for the next
few years. There were, to be sure, stumbling blocks; in 1908 he reported
that several state constitutions defined “corporation” in a way that
might sweep up a partnership defined as a separate legal person, giving
the partnership limited liability, “which, of course, is quite at war with
the whole conception of partnership.” 159 (The drafters never
contemplated a general partnership with limited liability. 160) The
Commission however urged Ames to continue drafting upon the
mercantile theory. 161
Broader trends in American jurisprudence lent weight to Ames’s
preference for the “mercantile” view, specifically the protorealist
“sociological jurisprudence” then being championed by Roscoe Pound
(himself a future dean of the Harvard Law School). 162 In several articles
published during this time Pound argued for rejecting formalist
approaches to the law, and called instead for “the adjustment of [legal]
156. Id. at 239 (Section 6)
157. Id. at 244 (Section 23). On the different rules states followed before the UPA was adopted,
see FRANCIS BURDICK, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 259–60
(Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1899).
158. See, e.g., COMM. ON COM. L., REPRINT OF DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS IN RE THE THEORY ON WHICH AN
ACT TO MAKE UNIFORM THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE DRAWN 18–19 (1910) [hereinafter
1910 PAMPHLET] (comment of Francis Burdick).
159. Charles Thaddeus Terry, Proceedings, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 964, 984 (1908) (proceedings
of the 18th Annual Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
160. The drafts of the UPA did include provisions for the limited partnership, which was,
however, a different legal entity than the general partnership. See 1906 DRAFT, supra note 150, at
252–55 (Sections 45–55). On the limited partnership’s career in the United States, see generally
Amalia Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American
Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511 (2003); and WARREN, supra note 34, at 302–26.
161. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 22, 51, 102
(1908) (report on drafting the UPA by Ames).
162. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 54–66 (1997).
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principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern
rather than to assumed first principles; for putting the human factor in
the central place.” 163 Indeed, Pound pointed to Ames’s work on the
Uniform Partnership Act as a prime example of this new approach in
his classic 1911 article “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence.” There he praised the “attempt to put the law of
partnership upon a better basis through the proposed partnership act
and to bring it into accord with the uniform understanding of business
men,” and criticized the resistance to the new approach from “teachers
of law, who insist that the traditional course of judicial opposition to the
mercantile view shall be perpetuated in the code.” 164
Then Ames died. At the end of 1909 he developed what may have
been early onset Alzheimer’s disease and died a few months later,
leaving the UPA unfinished. 165 The NCCUSL named William Draper
Lewis, dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, to succeed
Ames as drafter. While it is not possible to tell what occurred behind
the scenes, evidence suggests that the Committee began to have second
thoughts about the entity approach. Lewis reported that, when he was
named as drafter, “individual members of the Committee” asked him to
prepare two potential drafts, one taking the entity approach, one the
aggregate. 166 The debate was reopened.
To settle the aggregate/entity question the Committee on
Commercial Laws held a summit in Philadelphia in February 1911 to
discuss “the nature of the partnership” and the approach that should be
adopted when drafting the Act, inviting “a large number of judges, law
teachers, practicing members of the Bar, and representatives of
commercial bodies.” 167 After two days’ debate, the Committee swung
decisively behind the aggregate approach. A record of the meeting was
printed and circulated, allowing us to reconstruct why the Committee
abandoned Ames’s work, and the entity approach, in favor of the
aggregate approach.
These records also allow us to address a question that has
probably occurred to the reader by now: Why did the parties care so
fervently about the aggregate/entity distinction? Apart from tidying up
163. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609–10 (1908).
164. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591, 601–02 (1911).
165. Winship, supra note 8, at 633.
166. Lewis, supra note 76, at 93. Lewis was aided by his former student James Lichtenberger.
Id. In 1910 the Committee published a pamphlet with three different drafts: Ames’s last draft,
entity and aggregate drafts produced by Lewis and Lichtenberger, and the Partnership Act of 1890.
JAMES B. LICHTENBERGER & WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, TENTATIVE DRAFTS OF AN ACT TO MAKE
UNIFORM THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1910).
167. 1910 PAMPHLET, supra note 158, at 2.
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certain corners of partnership law, what difference did legal personhood
really make? As should be clear, while the common law did not treat
the partnership as a separate legal person, aspects of partnership law
had long distinguished between partnership and partners, 168 and
outside of legal disputes it was common to speak of the partnership
instead of the partners. 169 Even the initial “aggregate” draft that Lewis
produced in 1911 recognized “the business carried on by the partners as
an entity,” the chief legal point being that the “business [was] being
carried on by the partners in their separate legal capacities, not as
directors or agents for a separate legal entity.” 170 Furthermore, Lewis
acknowledged that “in the majority of the provisions, many of which
deal with subjects of the greatest consequence, it is entirely immaterial
whether the Act is drawn on the aggregate or on the entity theory of
partnership.” 171 Why, then, was so much ink spilled, and why after
initial acceptance was the entity approach rejected?
Some at the Philadelphia meeting did identify practical
problems with adopting the entity approach. Were the partnership
primarily liable for firm debts, and partners only secondarily liable, as
would be the case under an entity approach, several commentors feared
that a partnership creditor might have to file two suits to have a debt
repaid, one against the partnership and then, when that judgment went
unsatisfied, another against the partners. 172 The registration
requirement was another sticking point. Lewis feared that, if adopted,
this would create a new kind of business form, making the UPA “an Act
relative to registered partnerships and [that] would necessitate another
statute to deal with those which were unregistered.” 173 Several
commentors were unsure where the partnership’s legal domicile would
be under the entity theory. 174 Still other objections were products of the
common lawyer’s aversion to change. The University of Chicago’s Floyd
Mechem was blunt: “I do not like to see the common law changed. . . . I
do not like to see people start in to tinker with it.” 175
A more fundamental objection to the entity approach was
repeatedly voiced, however, one that illustrates an aspect of legal
personhood not well appreciated today. When touching on issues of
168. See supra text accompanying notes 32–36.
169. This point dates back to CORY, supra note 54, at 71.
170. 1910 PAMPHLET, supra note 158, at 1–2 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 12–13.
173. Id. at 10.
174. Id. at 26.
175. Id. at 17; see also Williston, supra note 91, at 209 (“Lawyers are distrustful and, as they
believe, rightfully distrustful of attempts to change the law root and branch.”).
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legal personhood and the divide between a business entity and its
owners, present-day commentators most often emphasize the economic
or managerial consequences that flow from legal acknowledgement of
the separate entity, whether that be shielding for entity assets, 176
limited liability for owners, 177 or surrender of control of firm assets to
managers. 178 (In the United States, extensive discussions also occurred
over whether the corporate legal person can assert constitutional
rights. 179) In all these accounts, the partnership typically appears as
imperfect, an organizational form lacking something owners should
want. 180 As one recent observer puts it, “modern commentators have by
and large . . . seen partnership law simply as a step towards later law’s
proper and inevitable recognition of the superior form of trading.” 181 At
the 1911 meeting, however, defenders of the partnership-as-aggregate
had a very different take. They rejected any approach that would treat
the partnership as an entity because they believed the traditional
partnership was a superior form of business, one that encouraged a
higher level of commercial morality than did the corporation.
Some nineteenth-century commentators had favored the
partnership because it lacked limited liability, a feature that would not
only make more assets available to creditors but would also encourage
partners to more carefully oversee their firms and fellow partners. 182 As
the legal historian Michael Lobban puts it, the partnership was seen as
the “most moral form of business, [because] . . . all partners would be
176. See, e.g., Hansmann et al., supra note 7, at 1337–38.
177. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 423–25.
178. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 7, at 433–37 (corporate law achieving both capital lock-in and
centralizing control of assets); Ricks, supra note 36, at 1306 (relinquishment of control of assets).
179. See Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010); Blair & Pollman, supra note 6 (analyzing
the Supreme Court’s treatment of corporations and constitutional rights); WINKLER, supra note 6,
at 324–95 (discussing Citzens United).
180. Thus the partnership provides only weak entity shielding, or lacks limited liability. For
exceptions to this negative view, see Lamoreaux, supra note 8, at 49–50 (noting partnership’s
structural flexibility as an advantage); and Ryan Bubb, Choosing the Partnership: English
Business Organizational Law During the Industrial Revolution, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 339
(2015) (explaining why English entrepreneurs chose the partnership form).
181. TELEVANTOS, supra note 13, at 28.
182. This view of the positive effects of unlimited liability survives today. See, e.g., Claire Hill
& Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interest: Why Investment Bankers Should
Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173 passim (2010) (arguing for imposing
personal liability on investment bankers as a way to deter financial risk-taking); Roger C.
Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW.
143, 175 (2002) (“The spread of limited liability partnerships accentuates the willingness of
partners to ignore the risks that other partners are taking.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880
(1991) (arguing for a general regime of unlimited shareholder liability in tort). In this vein, Erik
Gerding has pointed to recent scholarship arguing that encouraging financial institutions to use
less-utilized business forms, including the partnership, may tame risky behavior. Erik Gerding,
Remutualization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 797, 801 (2020).
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active in the business and would share liability.” 183 In England, “[t]he
impersonality of the joint-stock company, operating on the basis of
limited liability, was contrasted with the partnership, where the crucial
relationship was one of unreserved trust, grounded in mutual personal
knowledge.” 184 But the disciplining effect of unlimited liability was not
why the experts at the Philadelphia meeting opposed the entity theory,
for the entity theory, at least as embodied in Ames’s drafts, would not
have limited partners’ liability. While it made it more difficult to reach
a partner’s assets, partners would still have ultimately been
answerable for the partnership’s unpaid debts.
Participants at the Philadelphia meeting—the giants of
partnership law in their day—rejected the entity approach because it
threatened to sever the direct, unmediated link between partners and
those who did business with the partnership by inserting a new party,
the legal person of the partnership, between the two. Dean Lewis was
clear on this, stating that
[t]he serious objection [to the entity approach] . . . is deeper. When third persons deal with
a partnership they deal with the individual partners just as personally and directly as
they deal with the sole owner of a business. To make the liability of the partner a
secondary or contributory liability is refusing to recognize the real relation between the
partners and those who do business with the firm. 185

George Wharton Pepper, a professor at the University of
Pennsylvania and leader of the Philadelphia bar, echoed this
conclusion:
A fundamental objection to the entity theory is that it leaves the partner no status but
that of . . . the agent of “the firm.” But in point of fact he acts for himself and not merely
for others. He is a principal. He has the responsibility of a principal, morally,
economically, and legally. It is perverse and unintelligent to force him into a category
which takes no account of this fact. 186

In this the partnership compared favorably to the corporation,
and here we see the defense of the traditional view of the partnership
joined to criticism of the corporation. Participants at the partnership
summit made clear their wish to keep the partnership as unlike the
corporation as possible. (The sharp divide they drew between the two
may help explain American law’s historic hostility to business forms
that sat midway between corporation and partnership. 187) While some
corporate theorists of this era argued that the corporation was much
183. Lobban, supra note 46, at 614.
184. G. R. SEARLE, MORALITY AND THE MARKET IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN 87 (1998).
185. 1910 PAMPHLET, supra note 158, at 13.
186. Id. at 33.
187. See Guinnane et al., supra note 119, at 714–23; Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close
Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 268, 276–91 (2008)
(describing how legal norms posed a problem for closed corporations).
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like the partnership, these experts in partnership law were having none
of it. 188 The partnership was for them the antithesis of the corporation;
as the University of Chicago’s Floyd Mechem put it, “a corporation is a
legal person made up of the association of a number of individuals. A
partnership is just exactly not that.” 189 The last thing the participants
wanted was a partnership that resembled a corporation. Burton
Mansfield, a respected practitioner who represented the Chamber of
Commerce at the meeting, made this clear when he spoke of “too great
a tendency toward joint stock corporations, from the point of view of
allowing individuals to escape financial responsibility. I do not like that
phase of it. I think it would be very much better if partnership were
encouraged.” 190 Ames’s innovations were also opposed because there
had been earlier attempts to create a business form midway between
the corporation and partnership, and they were generally perceived as
unwieldy failures. As Mechem explained, “I am opposed to more
corporations. We have had in Michigan,” he explained,
much trouble as to the nature of the informal corporate association that you have in
Massachusetts. In Pennsylvania we had an association that gave us a great deal of
trouble. . . . [If] we declare that the partnership is a legal person, we are going to have just
that question in many States. 191

Lewis summed up his and the Committee’s view when he
concluded that the then-existing partnership encouraged moral
behavior in a way that a partnership with a separate legal personality
would not:
[S]o far as business men now separate their own personality from the personality of the
firm . . . they tend to do acts as a firm which lower the moral standards of the community.
I think we see that in corporations, and it seems to me that one of the chief issues that is
before you today is whether you want to give formal statutory sanction to a separation of
personality between the firm and the individual which will, in my opinion, and I think in
the opinion of others of much more experience than myself, be a direct blow to the
commercial morality of this country. 192

This view was widely shared. Looking back two decades later,
after the adoption of the UPA on the aggregate theory, Harvard Law
School professor Edward Warren identified as

188. Advocates of the “aggregate” view of the corporation. See Mark, supra note 2, at 1478–87
(discussing the “astonishingly rapid erosion” of the partnership analogy).
189. 1910 PAMPHLET, supra note 158, at 15.
190. Id. at 22–23.
191. Id. at 18. For an account of one such business form, Pennsylvania’s Partnership
Association, and its lack of success, see Naomi Lamoreaux, Revisiting American Exceptionalism:
Democracy and the Regulation of Corporate Governance, in ENTERPRISING AMERICA: BUSINESSES,
BANKS, AND CREDIT MARKETS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 48–59 (William Collins & Robert
Margo eds., 2015).
192. 1910 PAMPHLET, supra note 158, at 24–25.
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the most important matter in all partnership law . . . that the law should make partners
feel that partnership liabilities are their liabilities, to be met promptly by them out of all
their assets, joint or separate. The law should give the partners no excuse for feeling that
separate assets should not be touched until it has been demonstrated that joint assets are
insufficient. 193

The entity approach, which made partners mere guarantors for the
partnership with no direct tie to partnership creditors, would mean
those debts were “not buttressed by the same moral responsibility that
[they] be promptly met as is a primary liability.” 194
What emerged from the Philadelphia conclave was a consensus
in favor of the aggregate approach. At the NCCUSL meeting later that
year Lewis presented his draft, which he described as a “positive
negation of the proposition that you can regard a partnership as a
separate legal person.” 195 The Act he proposed was not without
innovations; as Lewis acknowledged, states’ partnership laws were so
divergent that any Uniform Act would unavoidably change some of
them. The Act also cleared up areas of confusion by adopting an entirely
new kind of common ownership, the “tenancy in partnership,” for
partnership property 196 and by borrowing the “charging order” remedy
from the Partnership Act 1890. 197 There was little dispute over these
changes, though, and no serious defense made of the entity approach
during the rest of the drafting process. After several more revisions
Lewis’s work was promulgated as the Uniform Partnership Act in 1914,
which defined a partnership as “an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.” 198
The fights were not quite done. In 1915 there was one more
exchange over the new Act, showing scholars still wrestling with the
entity concept. An article attacking the new UPA appeared in the
Harvard Law Review, arguing that whatever its drafters claimed, the
Act in fact treated the partnership as an entity. Written by Judson
Crane, later dean at the University of Pittsburgh, the article cited
Gierke and other “real entity” theorists—perhaps the only time legal
philosophy really appeared in the partnership debates—to argue that
“modern jurists are coming to accept the view that any group of human
beings united for a common purpose forms a real or natural entity

193. WARREN, supra note 34, at 38.
194. Id. at 39.
195. Proceedings, 34 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 798, 825 (1911) (proceedings of the 21st Annual
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
196. See Joseph H. Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for a
Definition, 15 MICH. L. REV. 609, 611 (1917).
197. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 28 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1914).
198. Id. § 6(1).
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distinct from its members.” 199 The Act, Crane claimed, in fact treated
the partnership as a “legal person . . . an entity having legal capacity
for rights and obligations.” 200 He cited specific sections for support.
Under the UPA, for instance, a partnership could take title to property
“in the partnership name,” which “would seem to make the partnership
as such the subject of rights, and thus a legal person.” 201 Other
provisions made “every partner the agent of the partnership, not of the
partners,” and required “the partnership, not the co-partners, to
indemnify the partner in respect of certain payments.” 202 And while the
new tenancy in partnership vested partnership property in the
partners, the tenure was so hemmed about that a partner’s right over
the property was “no more than nominal, and it does not materially
impair the ownership of partnership property by the partnership
entity.” 203 Given all this, Crane concluded, “it ought to be very difficult
for an open-minded court . . . to hold that a partnership is not vested
with rights and obligations, and therefore a person before the law.” 204
Lewis fired back with a response that showed how he viewed the
aggregate/entity distinction. Relying less on jurisprudence than what
appears to be homegrown metaphysics, he conceded that of course any
set of activities, such as those involved in conducting a business, could
be grouped together and “by the very fact [they] are grouped become[ ]
an entity.” 205 But this mental shortcut wasn’t the issue in partnership
law. For Lewis the issue was “whether the group of activities carried on
by the partners should be regarded as being carried on by them—which
is the actual fact—or as being carried on by a legal personality distinct
from the legal personalities of the partners.” 206 Because the Act never
ascribed the partnership’s acts to a separate legal person, Lewis
believed it did not adopt the entity theory. As Edward Warren later
explained it, for Lewis, “the definition of a partnership as a ‘legal
person’ seems to have been equivalent to a statement that a partnership
has a personality, just as a human being has a personality.” 207
After this, the debate dwindled. In partnership as in corporate
law, over the next few decades rigid adherence to one or another theory
199. Judson A. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762, 763
(1915).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 770.
202. Id. at 770–71.
203. Id. at 773.
204. Id. at 773–74.
205. William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act—A Reply to Mr. Crane’s Criticisms,
29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 160–61 (1915).
206. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
207. WARREN, supra note 34, at 299.
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of personhood came to seem less important as the malleable nature of
the concepts used, and the indeterminate results that could be derived
from them, became apparent and more accepted in the legal academy. 208
The UPA was slowly adopted, 209 and as the fights over its adoption
retreated, commentators were willing to admit that, while drafted on
the aggregate theory, it retained traces of the entity approach as well,
and that perhaps the practical consequence of the different approaches
was not as great as had once been assumed. At the end of the 1920s
Harvard’s corporation law specialist Merrick Dodd concluded that while
the Act “purports to adopt the aggregate concept,” its rules produced
“many of the results to which the entity theory would lead.” 210 One
understands the waspish comment of an early observer who asked, “If
the act had emanated from a legislative committee should we suspect
that the radicals had, in the language of the day, ‘put one over on’
the conservatives?” 211
Over the rest of the century scholars occasionally returned to the
question of whether the UPA embodied the aggregate view, or mixed
aggregate and entity, but without the passion or urgency that gripped
lawyers when the Act was drafted. 212 Most partnership cases simply did
not turn on whether the partnership was defined as aggregate or
entity. 213 In 1985 an unusual case appeared where the question did
matter. In Fairways Development Co. v. Title Insurance Co. of
Minnesota, a court held that a title insurance policy sold to a
partnership lapsed when two partners left, as their departure dissolved
the partnership, even though the underlying business continued—a

208. This of course reflects the triumph of legal realism. In corporation theory the debate over
the nature of the corporate personality was deflated after publication of John Dewey, The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926). See also Elizabeth Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1650–51.
209. By 1920 it had been adopted in thirteen states. H.S. Richards, Uniform Partnership Act,
1 WIS. L. REV. 5, 7 (1920).
210. E. Merrick Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REV. 977,
1011 (1929) (reversing order of quoted passages). Dodd’s article was criticizing one author who still
cared deeply about the divide, Edward Warren, whose Corporate Advantages Without
Incorporation spent its first hundred pages trying to bury the entity theory. See WARREN, supra
note 34, at 17–141.
211. WRIGHTINGTON, supra note 1, at 144–45.
212. See, e.g., A. Ladru Jensen, Is the Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an
Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1962); Rosin, supra note 8, 422–36; RIBSTEIN, supra
note 8; Winship, supra note 8. The articles addressing the issue appear to be almost completely
tax articles. But see Rosin, supra note 8, at 422–36.
213. See, e.g., Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1988) (“Most cases can, of course, be decided without resort to the general theory of
the partnership as an entity versus an aggregate.”).
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result dictated by the aggregate view of partnership. 214 The case
attracted extensive scholarly commentary, and when in the early 1990s
the UPA was redrafted, its successor, the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (“RUPA”), 215 explicitly adopted the entity approach, largely in
response to Fairways and fears that the aggregate approach dictated
that every time a partner left a firm the partnership dissolved. 216 RUPA
produced a good deal of scholarly commentary, but none of the fireworks
that accompanied the drafting of UPA. The entity status of the
partnership appeared settled.
IV. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CODA
Today one might think the issue is settled. RUPA defines the
partnership as an entity, and metaphysical discussions are long gone
from the law of business associations. 217 Corporate personhood has
become again an issue in corporation law, but the conversation occurs
in the language of law and economics or constitutional law and rarely
reaches partnerships. 218 With the spread of the limited liability
company (“LLC”), 219 partnerships have become less common, and
partnership law now seems important chiefly for limited partnerships
(“LPs”) and limited liability partnerships (“LLPs”), entities
concentrated in a few fields. 220 But the aggregate/entity issue in
partnership law has not completely disappeared. Surprisingly, it was a
214. 621 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ohio 1985). While this case followed blackletter partnership
law, it appears that in many states courts had turned a blind eye to this rule, which is one of the
reasons the case drew such attention. See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate
Revision of the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 435–38 (1991).
215. Adopted in several guises between 1993 and 1997.
216. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 2 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997)
(amended 2013). Though, even here, the entity approach had its limits; a partnership still had to
have two or more partners, for instance. See also Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–5, 4 n.15 (1993). It
should also be noted that a few states retain the UPA and its aggregate approach; New York, for
instance, still follows the UPA and thus states in its statute that the partnership is an aggregate.
See N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 10 (Consol. 2021) (“A partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”).
217. Intriguingly, debates over the entity status of some businesses live on in underexplored
areas of the law. Reciprocal exchanges in insurance, for instance, are sizeable enterprises that lack
entity status but seem to operate well. See Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116
MICH. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (2017).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 179–180. But see Hansmann et. al, supra note 7, at
1337 (discussing weak entity shielding in partnerships).
219. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.2 (2020).
220. See Christine Hurt, Extra Large Partnerships (BYU L., Rsch. Paper No. 20-10, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523375#
[https://perma.cc/NMH3-34YV].
But see Christine Hurt, Startup Partnerships, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2487, 2499 (2020) (discussing
ongoing issues raised by accidental partnerships).
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central issue in a case decided in 2020, one that shows us how much the
discourse over the partnership has changed in the last century.
United States v. Sanofi-Aventis, a case recently decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court, began in 2011 when three would-be
whistleblowers filed a qui tam claim under the False Claims Act
(“FCA”) against Sanofi-Aventis and other pharmaceutical firms in
federal court in New Jersey. 221 Three former employees of SanofiAventis alleged that the corporation had violated the FCA when
marketing Plavix, a drug used to prevent heart attacks and strokes. 222
Rather than pursue their claims individually, they decided to join
together in a business entity to do so, perhaps to maintain anonymity
temporarily. 223 But the FCA posed a problem, for it requires that in
certain situations a private plaintiff be “an ‘original source’ with direct
knowledge of the fraud.” 224 If the lawsuit against Sanofi was
maintained by an entity separate from its owners, that entity might not
qualify as an original source. So the three whistleblowers formed a
Delaware limited liability partnership to conduct the litigation, “JKJ
Partnership 2011 LLP” (“JKJ”), and stated in the partnership
agreement that the partnership “shall not be a separate legal entity
distinct from its Partners.” 225 In other words, they elected to be treated
as an aggregate. At the same time, in what would later become a point
of contention, the agreement also provided that “withdrawal of a
Partner shall not cause dissolution of the Partnership,” a provision
which seemingly contradicted the decision to be treated as an
aggregate. 226
In 2016, several years after JKJ filed its initial complaint
against Sanofi, one of the partners left and was replaced by another
whistleblower also claiming direct knowledge of the fraud. 227 When this
chain of events was brought to the district court’s attention in 2017, it
faced issues rarely raised anymore: Was JKJ an aggregate or entity?
And, if it was an aggregate, had it dissolved when one of its original
partners left? The answers mattered because, if JKJ dissolved in 2016
and was replaced by a new partnership, the new partnership might be
ineligible to pursue the litigation, due to a different provision of the FCA
221. 226 A.3d 1117 (Del. 2020). My thanks to Michael DiPietro, who brought this case to my
attention.
222. These facts and conclusions are drawn from In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 315 F. Supp. 3d 817 (D.N.J. 2018), vacated, 974 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2020).
223. In re Plavix, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 820. The original complaint listed them as “Partner A,”
“Partner B,” and “Partner C.”
224. Id. at 824.
225. Id. at 830.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 821.
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that bars private parties from “intervening” in ongoing cases. 228 In
2018, the federal district court ruled that JKJ was an aggregate, as
stated in its partnership agreement, and under rules governing
aggregate partnerships had dissolved when a partner left in 2016. 229 A
different holding, the court stated, would lead to the “absurd result that
JKJ would be permitted to proceed as a relator because it is legally
indistinguishable from . . . its members, but would also be permitted to
change its membership without becoming a different legal entity
because it is legally independent and distinguishable from its present
membership.” 230 The court then dismissed the case. 231
Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, which concluded the case raised novel questions of
Delaware partnership law and certified several questions to the
Delaware Supreme Court, the most important being:
A limited liability partnership is formed to file and prosecute a specific lawsuit. Its
formational documents say both that the partnership is not “a separate legal entity
distinct from its Partners” . . . and that the “withdrawal of a Partner shall not cause a
dissolution of the Partnership.” If one of the partners leaves the partnership and a new
partner joins, does it stay the same partnership? Or is it a new partnership? 232

In answering these queries, the Delaware Supreme Court first
had to determine whether a partnership could choose to be treated as
an aggregate instead of an entity at all. The court held that it could. 233
It pointed to the state’s partnership statute (“DRUPA”), which
specifically provided that “[a] partnership is a separate legal entity
which is an entity distinct from its partners unless otherwise provided
in a statement of partnership existence or a statement of qualification
and in a partnership agreement.” 234 While Delaware placed this
provision squarely in its statute, the same idea, it turns out, lurked in
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, whose official comments state
that a “partnership agreement may govern the relations among
partners and between the partnership and the partners according to the
aggregate model.” 235 (Sanofi-Aventis appears to be the first case
228. See id. at 829–32.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 831.
231. Id.
232. United States v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 18-2472, 2019 WL 10271190, at *1 (3d Cir.
June 12, 2019).
233. United States v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 226 A.3d 1117, 1128 (Del. 2019).
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-201(a) (2020) (emphasis added). The Delaware Supreme Court
opinion also cited provisions of the act giving “maximum effect to the princip[les] of freedom of
contract.” Sanofi-Aventis, 226 A.3d at 1127.
235. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201 cmt. 3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1997)
(amended 2013).
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involving these provisions. 236) Because it elected to be treated as an
aggregate in its partnership agreement, and because the clause doing
so stated it would trump any other clause in the agreement to the
contrary, the court concluded that JKJ had dissolved in 2016 when a
partner left. “JKJ was not distinct from partners A, B, and C,” the court
stated. “The withdrawal of B and the substitution of G changed the
composition from A, B, and C to A, C, and G. JKJ cannot be indistinct
from A, B, and C and remain the same entity with a new cast of
partners.” 237
Sanofi-Aventis is not yet done—the Third Circuit recently
remanded it to the district court, because of the possibility that the new
partnership’s entry into the litigation was not an “intervention” under
the FCA. Yet the Third Circuit opinion and remand pointed to one more
twist dictated by the aggregate theory. 238 As it pointed out, a “key
feature of aggregate partnerships is that they cannot sue or be sued in
their own names.” 239 Because of that, Judge Bibas reasoned, “one could
question whether either partnership was ever a proper relator.” 240
Resolving that question was left to the district court. In the meantime,
Delaware has moved to change its law and avoid a repeat of the
situation in Sanofi-Aventis. In an amendment to DRUPA which took
effect in August 2021, Delaware’s law now provides that a partnership
that elects in its partnership agreement to be an aggregate will not
dissolve merely because a partner leaves or joins. 241
A century on we find the issue of aggregate and entity still
lurking in partnership law, but utterly transformed. At the turn of the
twentieth century the question of whether the partnership was an
236. See id. nn.71–72 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-201(a) and Sanofi-Aventis, 226 A.3d
at 1117, respectively).
237. Sanofi-Aventis, 226 A.3d at 1132.
238. In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir.
2020).
239. Id. at 236.
240. Id. The Third Circuit asked the district court on remand to decide “whether that is true
and, if so, whether to allow amendment so that the partners can name themselves as the real
relators in interest.” Id. This could be an issue for plaintiffs in Sanofi-Aventis, but not necessarily;
while under the aggregate approach all partners had to be individually named when the
partnership was a plaintiff, before RUPA was adopted many states passed “common name
statutes” allowing the partnership to be named as plaintiff, WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 338 (3d ed. 2001), and Delaware has such a common name statute.
Sillman v. DuPont, 302 A.2d 327, 331 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3904).
241. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(c) (2021) (“Unless otherwise provided in a partnership
agreement, the provisions of this chapter apply to a partnership that has a statement of
partnership existence or a statement of qualification and a partnership agreement that has
modified §§ 15-201(a), 15-203 and 15-501 of this title.”). While the language is not straightforward,
its effect is that a partnership electing to be an aggregate will still be governed by the dissolution
provisions of DRUPA, which do not mandate dissolution on every change in the membership of the
partnership. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-201(a) (2021).
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aggregate or entity was fundamental, a basic choice to be made by
lawmakers which would dictate how all of partnership law would then
be framed. The answer had economic and moral consequences, shaping
both specific rules adopted and partners’ larger understandings of the
demands and obligations placed on them. This is no longer so. Now, in
a move that would surely have baffled those who clashed over the UPA,
a partnership is an entity, unless it’s an aggregate, or unless the parties
have mixed and matched elements of both approaches, as they did in
the JKJ partnership agreement. No longer a fundamental
determination set by the law, entity and aggregate are choices to be
made by the partners themselves, items selected off a statutory menu.
The great partnership debates are over.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have long debated what it means for a business
entity to be a legal person. Today those debates focus on the corporation,
and are usually conducted either in the language of law and economics,
asking how the law locks in a business’s assets or partitions them
among the business and its owners, or in the vernacular of
constitutional law, arguing over whether and how a corporation can
assert constitutional rights. This Article contributes to present-day
debates over legal personhood by looking back over a hundred years to
debates over a different business form, the partnership. In the decades
around the turn of the twentieth century, legal scholars wrestled with
the legal personhood of the partnership by asking whether the law
should view it as an entity or an aggregate. Reformers pushing the
“entity” view argued that partnership law should be rewritten to treat
a partnership as an entity, a separate legal person. This, they believed,
would both bring coherence to partnership law’s sometimes discordant
rules and bring the law into line with businessmen’s views of the
partnership. At the turn of the twentieth century, they came close to
writing the entity view into the new Uniform Partnership Act. These
reformers eventually lost, however, to advocates of the “aggregate”
view, who defended the traditional, common law belief that a
partnership was simply an association of its partners with no legal
existence apart from them. Debates over this seemingly abstract topic
were often impassioned because they raised basic questions of whether
the law should follow business practices and how businessmen should
perceive their responsibilities. Ultimately, the aggregate view prevailed
because drafters of the Uniform Act were concerned about an
issue absent from present-day debates: the moral consequences of
legal personhood.

